Drawing upon signaling theory and the attention-based view of the firm, we study if signal receivers attend differently to different types of signals when they interact with different firms or operate under different market conditions. Our theorizing and empirical analysis is situated in the context of the follow-on fundraising activities by private equity managers managing a first fund. Using a sample of 238 private equity partnerships, we find that overall performance of the first private equity fund and its two components, namely realized performance and unrealized performance, positively influence the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Nevertheless, the impact of realized performance on fundraising is less important for funds investing in early stage companies (early stage funds) as compared to funds investing in mature companies (late stage funds). Moreover, realized performance is a more important signal to fund investors in hot equity markets than in cold equity markets.
IntroductIon
Traditionally, signaling theory has focused on the deliberate communication of positive information signals from the perspective of the signaler in an effort to convey firm quality and thereby ease resource mobilization from outside stakeholders (Gera, 2009) . Signaling has acquired a prominent position in the management literature, including strategic management, entrepreneurship and human resource management. The strategic management literature, for instance, has mainly focused on how firms signal quality to investors and other stakeholders, the entrepreneurship literature has studied the role of board, top management team, investor and founder characteristics for signaling, and the human resource management literature has examined signaling during the recruitment process (see Connelly et al. (2011) for an excellent overview of the literature).
Although scholars have previously argued that the environment in which firms signal may influence the attention of receivers towards these signals (Gulati and Higgens, 2003) , the empirical evidence on the impact of the signaling environment is rather mixed. While some scholars found evidence on the impact of the signaling environment on different aspects, including the observability of the signal (Carter, 2006) and receiver attention (Gulati and Higgens, 2003) , other scholars have found limited evidence of the role of the signaling environment on the effectiveness of signals (Lester et al., 2006) . More importantly, next to our limited understanding of the role of the signaling environment, we lack insight into how signals may have different consequences for different firms in specific situations (Connelly et al., 2011) . In this study, we address these shortcomings by studying how different signals may have different consequences when receivers interact with different firms and operate in different environments.
Our theoretical and empirical analysis is situated in the context of follow-on fundraising activities by private equity (PE) managers managing a first PE fund (Wright and Robbie, 1998) . PE managers typically engage in new fundraising activities some three years after raising their first fund (Rider and Swaminathan, 2012; Sahlman, 1990) . At the time of new fundraising activities, however, the majority of investments of the first-time fund are often unrealized, causing significant information asymmetries between PE managers and capital providers. It has been well acknowledged that, in situations with high levels of information asymmetries, signaling is important (Balboa and Marti, 2007) . Therefore, PE fund managers routinely report their realized and unrealized returns to their capital providers (Cumming and Walz, 2010) . In this study, we focus on whether and how these different performance signals-which may entail both positive and negative information towards prospective capital providers-influence the likelihood that PE firms managing a first-time fund raise a follow-on fund. Further, we study to which extent the impact of different performance signals is contingent on the type of firm (early versus late stage funds) and environment (hot versus cold equity markets). For this purpose, we use a worldwide sample of 238 PE firms managing a first-time fund of which 85 raised a follow-on fund. For each first-time fund we have access to, amongst others, its overall performance, split in realized performance and unrealized performance.
The present study makes a number of theoretical contributions. First, our study contributes to the signaling literature. Signaling models have often distinguished between high-quality and lowquality firms, where high-quality firms will communicate positive information signals to outside stakeholders (Connelly et al., 2011) . However, firms reside on a quality continuum and not on a dichotomy, and may also communicate negative information signals to outside stakeholders. By studying two continuous signals, namely realized and unrealized performance (which may convey both positive and negative information), we are able to provide more fine-grained insights on the impact of signals. We further contribute to signaling theory by increasing our understanding of the role of receiver attention on the effectiveness of signaling. Whereas most scholars have focused on the perspective of the signaler, our paper responds to a call for more research to take the perspective of the receiver (Gera, 2009) . At the same time, our research contributes to an under researched aspect of signaling theory, namely the signaling environment (Connelly et al., 2011) . We contribute to the discussion on the role of the signaling environment, that has provided convincing conceptual arguments, but that has failed to provide convincing empirical evidence so far. We further show that not only the signaling environment in which firms operate influences signal interpretation by signal receivers (see for instance Gulati and Higgins, 2003) , but that signal receivers also look differently at the performance signals communicated by different firms.
Second, this study contributes to the PE literature. Our theoretical contribution lies in advancing a signaling theory of PE firm fundraising. Previous studies have shown the importance of performance signals for subsequent fundraising by PE managers (e.g., Cumming et al., 2005; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) . In this study, however, we provide a more contextualized understanding of the role of performance signals on subsequent fundraising. We do so by arguing and showing that performance is not a homogeneous construct and that both realized performance signals and unrealized performance signals of first-time funds influence the likelihood of raising follow-on funds. More significantly, the value of realized performance is contingent upon the context and situation in which prospective capital providers operate, making realized performance signals more important for late stage first-time funds and first-time funds that raise follow-on financing during hot equity markets. Research, Vol. 33 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 2 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol33/iss2/2 Finally, we contribute to a dearth of research on the functioning of first-time PE funds (e.g., Zarutskie, 2010) . Raising follow-on funds is a critical activity for PE firms managing a first PE fund and many are eventually unsuccessful in this activity (Rider and Swaminathan, 2012) . We study the impact of performance signals of first-time funds on the probability of raising a follow-on fund. Signals are argued to be particularly relevant for these PE firms, which are confronted with large information asymmetries between the PE firm's management and potential investors.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly describe the private equity setting in which we situate our study. Second, we develop our theoretical framework. Third, we outline the methods, including the sample, variables and econometric approach used. Fourth, we present the main research findings. Finally, we conclude by discussing our results from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. tHe reseArcH context: prIvAte equIty fundrAIsIng PE investors are specialized financial intermediaries, which usually invest in illiquid assets, that is, privately held companies (Cumming and Walz, 2010) . Two types of PE investors are frequently distinguished, namely venture capital (VC) and buyout investors (Wright and Robbie, 1998) . VC refers to equity or equity-linked investments made for the launch, early growth or expansion of young companies. Buyout refers to investments in more mature companies with established business plans to acquire equity stakes from existing shareholders such as families or corporates.
PE firms are typically organized as limited liability partnerships whereby PE managers act as general partners managing PE funds and the capital providers (including institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds, but also governments, sovereign wealth funds, corporations, family offices and private individuals) serve as limited partners of the PE funds (Sahlman, 1990) . The economic life of most funds is set at around 10 years, although provisions are often included to extend the life of the funds by two years (Sahlman, 1990) . Each fund moves through various stages. During the investment period stage, usually the first four years after establishing a fund, the investment portfolio is formed. During this investment period stage, PE firms may also provide value-adding services to their portfolio companies. During the fund maturity stage, some three to seven years after establishing a fund, follow-on financing rounds are provided to the portfolio companies in order to further support their growth. Finally, in the harvest or liquidation stage, generally from five years after establishing a fund to the end of a fund's life, fund managers are focused on exiting their investments thereby turning their illiquid stakes in privately held companies into realized returns.
Given the limited economic life of many PE funds, however, PE firm managers (general partners) need to raise new funds from limited partners on a regular basis to continue their activities (Balboa and Martí, 2007) . PE managers often engage in fundraising activities to establish a new fund some three years after the start of their previous fund (Rider and Swaminathan, 2012; Sahlman, 1990) . Nevertheless, a large percentage of PE firms only raise one fund and eventually "exit" the market or experience mortality (Rider and Swaminathan, 2012) . This is not surprising as the relationship between PE managers and capital providers is characterized by significant information asymmetries (Sahlman, 1990) , especially for first-time funds where fund managers often need to raise follow-on funds before exiting their investments from the first fund. In such a context characterized by significant information asymmetry, signaling by PE managers may alleviate some of the difficulties they experience when raising a follow-on fund.
tHeoretIcAL frAmework
Signaling theory is useful in describing behavior when two parties have access to different information (Connelly et al., 2011) . In such situations, the sender of the signal must choose whether and how to signal information, whereas the receiver must choose how to interpret the signal. Typically, signalers are insiders who obtain information which outsiders could find useful (Connelly et al., 2011) . Further, for signaling to take place, the signaler should benefit from some action from the receiver that the receiver would otherwise not have done; or: the signal should cause selection of the signaler in favor of alternatives. There are two major characteristics of efficacious signals. The first is signal observability, referring to the extent to which outsiders are able to observe signals. The second characteristic is signal cost, indicating that some signalers are in a better position than others to absorb the associated costs of generating signals (Spence, 1973) .
PE follow-on fund raising is an interesting context to study the impact of signals. The relationship between PE managers and prospective capital providers is characterized by significant information asymmetry (Sahlman, 1990; Balboa and Marti, 2007) . PE managers are likely to possess superior information on the quality of the funds they manage compared to prospective capital providers. This may lead to adverse selection among other problems. Adverse selection pertains to the risk that capital providers invest in low-quality PE funds which have been presented to them as high-quality projects. This may be especially the case for follow-on funds of first-time funds which typically lack a track record of successful investments, because PE managers typically engage in new fundraising activities well before the outcome of the majority of investments in first-time funds become visible (Sahlman, 1990) . Indeed, as Gompers (1996) indicate, more established funds will not need to signal as investors have evaluated their performance over many years and believe in their ability (or not). In such a situation, signaling may be especially valuable to create a separating equilibrium where prospective capital providers are able to distinguish highquality from low-quality PE firms.
There is significant evidence that the overall performance of PE funds will signal fund quality to prospective capital providers which subsequently increases the likelihood of PE managers of these better performing funds to raise follow-on funds. Gompers and Lerner (1998) demonstrate how the value of equity held by a PE firm in companies brought public increases the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. More recently, Cumming et al. (2005) provide direct evidence that pension funds commit a greater amount of capital to Australian VC firms that achieve superior performance in terms of internal rates of return (IRRs) of previously managed funds. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) provide further evidence that capital flows into PE firms are positively related to past performance. While there is no research looking into the impact of performance as a signal to future fund providers in the case of first-time funds, we expect that the previously established relationship between fund performance and follow-on fund raising likelihood will also hold for first-time funds. This is because potential investors in these follow-on funds are confronted with large information asymmetries, even more so than in later follow-on fund raising when a fund reputation has been established. Further, signalers may benefit from giving performance signals, which are observable through their reporting and which are costly to obtain. We therefore present the following base hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Higher overall performance of first-time funds will increase the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund.
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Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Vol. 33 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 2 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol33/iss2/2 Importantly, previous research linking PE fund performance to follow-on fund raising has assumed that performance is a homogeneous construct. Nevertheless, first-time funds may be particular cases as only part of the overall return will be realized at the time of engaging in new fundraising activities, while another part will represent returns on unrealized exits. While the measurement of returns on investments that have been exited is straightforward, matters are far more complicated for reporting returns on unrealized investments, since this reporting hinges on the valuations of privately held companies determined by the PE managers themselves (Cumming and Walz, 2010) . The particular situation of first-time fund follow-on fundraising in a PE context allows us to examine the value of two distinct signals related to PE firm quality, namely realized performance and unrealized performance.
First, PE managers may signal fund quality through the realized performance of their firsttime funds, which represents the investment return exits realized by PE managers on investments by way of initial public offerings, acquisitions, or other forms of exit (Wright and Robbie, 1998) . Realized performance may act as an efficacious signal, as this performance is observable through the PE firm's reporting and is difficult to obtain. It is indeed difficult for PE managers to realize a successful exit and generate a significant return upon an investment. Specifically, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) show that after the length of a typical venture capital investment, almost 40 percent of U.S. venture capital-backed companies fail. Second, realized performance of first-time funds at fundraising will be correlated with the quality of PE funds' investments although not perfectly, since PE managers typically engage in fundraising well before the end of the economic life of the first-time fund (Gompers, 1996) . Hence, PE managers might not have had enough time to realize an exit on their most promising investments by the time they need to raise new funds.
The reported return on unrealized investments (or unrealized performance) is likely to be particularly important for first-time funds given the gap between the time when PE managers start raising a follow-on fund and the end of the economic life of the first-time fund. However, the evaluation of the unrealized performance of PE funds is more subject to the discretion of PE fund managers. Cumming and Walz (2010), for instance, convincingly showed that there are systematic biases in PE managers' valuations of private portfolio companies that are not yet sold. Specifically, Cumming and Walz (2010) find that these biases depend on the accounting and legal environment in a country and on proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between institutional investors and PE managers. This might turn the value of unrealized performance signals less valuable to potential investors.
However, we argue that unrealized performance signals will still be used by prospective capital providers although they are partially subject to the discretion of PE managers. This is because, in the case of first time funds, the limited availability of realized performance will trigger both signalers and receivers to provide or look for other types of signals, even though they may not be that objective. We argue that, while realized performance will be a useful signal in our context, also unrealized performance will be an important signal for potential investors. This is because, after considering realized performance, which at the time of follow-on fund raising only represents a very partial picture on the quality of the fund, considerable information asymmetries continue to exist. Information on unrealized performance may help overcome the disadvantages of such information asymmetries, and may help PE managers of first-time funds to signal their quality beyond realized performance.
Unrealized performance is traditionally reported to limited partners during the fund raising process and is therefore observable. Moreover, although there might be systematic biases, valuation committees in PE firms comprised of PE managers and outsiders and certification by external auditors, should be able to dampen the concern that low quality funds present themselves as high quality funds (Bygrave et al., 1989) . Hence, given that unrealized performance is likely to capture the majority of value that will have been created by first-time funds at the time of fundraising and that several mechanisms are at work which makes it difficult and costly for low quality funds to present them as high quality funds with high unrealized performance, unrealized performance is expected to serve as a valuable signal for prospective capital providers.
Overall, we argue that both realized performance and unrealized performance might serve as valuable signals that influence the decision making of prospective capital providers. Therefore, The above hypotheses assume that both reported realized and unrealized performance function as signals to potential investors when managers of first-time PE funds raise subsequent funds. Signal receivers, however, are likely to put more or less attention on particular signals when they observe signals from different firms or operate under different conditions. This is in line with the basic premises of the attention-based view of the firm. Attention is defined as "the noticing, encoding, interpreting and focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers." (Ocasio, 1997: 189) . Central to the attention-based view is the notion of selective attention. The principle of selective attention indicates that "decision makers will be selective in the issues and answers they attend to at any one time, and what decision-makers do depends on what issues and answers they focus their attention on" (Ocasio, 1997: 190) . By consequence, selective attention facilitates perception and action towards what is being considered, and away from others. Indeed, as Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) point out, not all events are attended equally. "Selective attention to events is driven by salience (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) and salience is shaped by how individuals, organizations, and industries enact events in the external environment (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001) ." Gulati and Higgins (2003) showed that these ideas may be extended towards the context of investment decisions by capital providers operating in hot versus cold public equity markets.
We argue that prospective capital providers are less likely to focus on the realized performance signals of early stage first-time funds as compared to late stage first time funds. Rider and Swaminathan (2012) show that the vast majority of PE firms raise a fund within three years of their last fund closing. Especially for first-time VC funds, which focus on early stage investments, there might not be sufficient time for PE managers to realize successful exits. While there is evidence that young VC firms bring their portfolio companies public prematurely to establish a reputation, Gompers (1996) shows that companies are typically around 4.5 years old when they are prematurely brought public. Hence, there might simply not be enough time for VC managers to push for a successful exit and demonstrate some level of realized performance before followon fundraising starts. More importantly, even if VC managers are able to demonstrate realized performance, this might not necessarily produce an optimal outcome for existing capital providers
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Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Vol. 33 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 2 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol33/iss2/2 (which are likely to contribute financing for subsequent funds as well). Gompers (1996) shows that more money is left on the table through higher underpricing when young VC firms try to establish a reputation. For first-time late stage funds, however, which focus on investments in more mature companies, it might be relatively more straightforward to demonstrate a successful exit with less pressure to push for premature exits. Late stage investments are often exited more quickly as compared to early stage investments (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007) . Overall, prospective capital providers might attach more attention to realized performance for late stage PE funds as opposed to early stage PE funds. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3: Higher realized performance will have a stronger influence on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund for late stage funds compared to early stage funds
We further argue that next to the characteristics of PE funds, the context will influence the signaling value of realized performance. Specifically, we distinguish between hot and cold equity markets. Specifically, prospective investors are more likely to focus on realized performance during hot equity markets as opposed to cold equity markets. During hot equity markets, PE fund managers should have ample opportunities to exit their portfolio companies by taking their portfolio companies public, which has been recognized to be the most important and profitable way for PE funds to exit an investment (Gompers and Lerner, 2004) . Public equity markets are receptive for new equity offerings often at interesting terms. Moreover, private markets represent another important exit route, for instance, through mergers and acquisitions (Cumming and Macintosh, 2003) . Valuations in these private markets often follow conditions in public equity markets (Cumming and Walz, 2010) . Hence, during hot equity markets, the time might be particularly ripe for PE fund managers to demonstrate their abilities and exit their portfolio companies. During hot equity markets, prospective capital providers are hence particularly likely to direct their attention towards realized performance signals by first-time PE funds as they are aware of the ample possibilities to realized successful exits in such a context. During cold markets, however, the exit options might be limited, even for PE managers of high quality funds. Moreover, it might be a more lucrative strategy to wait and exit promising portfolio companies when exit markets become more receptive. This implies that prospective capital providers are less likely to pay attention to realized performance signals during cold equity markets. Therefore, following the basic premise of the attention based view, indicating that what indicators (in our case: signals) decision makers will focus their attention on is highly depending on the context, we argue that, in hot equity markets, potential investors will to a large extent focus their attention towards realized performance signals. Subsequently, realized performance will have a larger impact on follow-on fund raising likelihood in such a context. We offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Higher realized performance will have a stronger influence on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund in hot equity markets compared to cold equity markets.
metHod
Data
The data for this study was obtained from Preqin. Preqin provides information on the PE, real estate, hedge funds and infrastructure asset classes, which encompasses the following areas that are critical for our study, namely funds, fundraising and performance. The Preqin PE database covers performance returns for over 5,800 PE funds. Preqin claims it is "the world's most extensive and transparent database of private equity and venture capital fund performance. In terms of aggregate value, this [database] represents around 70% of all capital ever raised."
For the purpose of this study, we selected all first-time funds from the Preqin database, totaling 865 firms at the end of December 2010. Of these firms 343 (39.65%) raised a follow-on fund and 522 (60.35%) did not raise a follow-on fund. We eliminated those first-time funds for which essential data such as performance measures and fund size was lacking. This resulted in a final sample of 238 first-time funds, where 85 funds (35.71%) raised a follow-on fund and 153 funds (64.29%) did not raise a follow-on fund.
Measures
Dependent variable. The dependent variable Likelihood of raising a follow-on fund is a dummy variable equaling one if a PE firm managing a first-time fund raises a follow-on fund and zero otherwise.
Independent variables.
The key independent variables are correlates of fund performance. Specifically, we use three performance measures for each first-time fund. These measures are overall performance (a multiple) defined as distributions plus unrealized value. Realized performance defined as distributions received to date as a percentage of called capital. Unrealized performance defined as valuation of unrealized investments as percentage of called capital. We take the natural logarithm of these performance measures which has the advantage that it functions as a normalizing transformation and decreases the probability that extreme observations will affect the findings. Performance is measured in the year before fundraising. For those PE firms which do not raise a follow-on fund, we measure performance three years after the vintage year of the firsttime fund. This corresponds with a stylized fact in the PE industry: PE investors typically engage in fundraising activities to establish a new PE fund some three years after the start of their previous fund (Rider and Swaminathan, 2012; Sahlman, 1990 We use the yearly S&P500 return to measure the market conditions in which a fund was raised. The S&P500 return is highly correlated with the return on the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) World index (0.9856; p < 0.001). We define hot equity markets as those where yearly returns are above the median (8%) and cold markets as those where returns are below the median. As such, we follow Gompers et al. (2008) , studying determinants of the likelihood that a VC firm will invest in a portfolio company, and employing a number of measures related to IPO activity to assess public market signals.
Control variables.
We control for macro-economic evolutions and PE fund characteristics. For macro-economic evolutions, we include the ratio of private equity raised on GDP. This allows us to control for the cyclical nature of fundraising in private equity markets (Gompers and Lerner,
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Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Vol. 33 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 2 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol33/iss2/2 2001). Specifically, we calculated the ratio of private equity raised to GDP for the US economy. We use statistics for the US because the bulk of PE firms in our sample are located in the US. Moreover, private equity markets in other regions around the world have typically followed the evolution of fundraising in the US market. For PE firm characteristics, we control for fund size, location and industry focus. Fund size is calculated as the natural logarithm of capital under management of the first-time fund. We control for PE firm location to control for differences in the development of PE markets for different regions around the globe. We make a distinction between firms located in the US, Europe and rest of the world. We use firms located in the US as the base category. We also control for firm industry focus as PE investors might specialize in investments within particular industries or have a more generalist investment strategy.
Econometric Approach
Our dependent variable is dichotomous and hence we use logistic regression models. An assumption in traditional logistic regression models is that observations are independent of each other. Nevertheless, funds with the same vintage year might share particular characteristics. To deal with such potential clustering in our data, we use the "cluster" option in Stata and report robust standard errors for each regression coefficient. To test hypotheses 3 and 4, we split the full sample into respectively early stage versus late stage funds and hot versus cold equity markets. We consciously opt not to interact realized performance and unrealized performance with a fund stage variable or equity market index in a full-sample analysis. Unlike linear models, the coefficient of interaction terms in nonlinear models does not represent the marginal effect of the interaction, and its statistical significance cannot be tested using a t-test and may even be of an opposite sign (Hoetker, 2007) . Our approach is consistent with previous research confronted with a similar challenge (e.g., Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). We use seemingly unrelated estimation, or the "Suest" command in Stata, to compare coefficients between the different logistic regression models (Weesie, 1999) . Table I reports descriptive statistics for the overall sample of first-time PE funds, and the subsamples of early stage PE funds, late stage PE funds, PE funds which engage in fundraising during hot equity markets and PE funds which engage in fundraising during cold equity markets. Table II reports the correlations between the dependent and independent variables. There is no indication that multicollinearity may unduly influence our results.
resuLts
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
mAIn resuLts
The results of the logit regressions estimating the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund are reported in Table III . In the first model, we focus on the impact of overall performance of firsttime funds on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. In the second model, we split up overall performance and focus on the impact of realized performance and unrealized performance of first-time funds on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. In the third model, we report the impact of realized performance and unrealized performance of first-time funds on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund for respectively early stage funds (Model 3A) and late stage funds (Model 3B). In the fourth and final model, we report the impact of realized performance and unrealized performance of first-time funds on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund during respectively hot equity markets (Model 4A) and cold equity markets (Model 4B).
Hypothesis 1 stated that higher performance of first-time funds would increase the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Model 1 shows a positive relationship between the overall performance of first-time funds (β = 2.31; p < 0.01) and the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. This provides support for Hypothesis 1: higher overall performance signals PE firm quality which increases the likelihood of first-time funds to raise a follow-on fund.
Hypothesis 2 stated that (a) higher realized performance and (b) higher unrealized performance of first-time funds would increase the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Model 2 shows that first-time funds with higher realized performance have a higher likelihood of raising a follow-on fund (β = 0.22; p < 0.001). First-time funds with higher unrealized performance also have a higher likelihood of raising a follow-on fund (β = 1.06; p < 0.01). Overall, this provides support for Hypothesis 2a and 2b: both higher realized performance and unrealized performance signals PE firm quality which increases the likelihood of first-time funds to raise a follow-on fund.
Hypothesis 3 stated that higher realized performance of first-time funds would have a stronger influence on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund for late stage funds compared to early stage funds. Model 3A reports the findings for early stage funds. We fail to find a significant impact of realized performance of first-time, early stage funds on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Unrealized performance has a positive impact on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund for first-time, early stage funds (β = 1.90; p < 0.05). Model 3B reports the findings for late stage funds. We find a positive impact of both realized performance (β = 0.51; p < 0.001) and unrealized performance (β = 1.46; p < 0.10) of first-time, late stage funds on the likelihood of raising a followon fund. Providing additional supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3, the coefficient of realized performance is significantly larger for first-time, late stage funds compared to first-time, early stage funds (p < 0.05). The coefficient for unrealized performance is not significantly different between first-time early stage and late stage funds.
Hypothesis 4 stated that higher realized performance of first-time funds would have a stronger influence on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund in hot relative to cold equity markets. During hot equity markets, the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund increases significantly when first-time funds report higher realized performance (β = 0.53; p < 0.001) and higher unrealized performance (β = 1.82; p < 0.05). During cold equity markets, we fail to find a significant impact of realized performance of first-time funds on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. We do find a positive impact of unrealized performance by first-time funds on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund during cold equity markets (β = 1.30; p < 0.05). Providing additional supporting evidence for hypothesis 4, the coefficient of realized performance of first-time funds is significantly larger during hot relative to cold equity markets (p < 0.05).
dIscussIon And concLusIon
This study aimed at contributing to our limited understanding of the effectiveness of signaling for different firms operating in different environments. Specifically, we assessed how different performance signals affected follow-on fund raising likelihood in the case of first-time PE funds, hereby considering different types of performance for different firms (early versus late stage funds)
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Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Vol. 33 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 2 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol33/iss2/2 and different contexts (hot versus cold equity markets). Our findings indicate that, while overall performance, realized performance and unrealized performance function as effective signals, positively influencing follow-on fundraising likelihood, the strength of these signals is contingent on a number of factors. Specifically, we found that the impact of realized performance is larger in case of late stage follow-on fundraising and in hot equity markets. We attribute this to the selective attention of potential investors, who direct their attention to a larger extent to realized performance in cases such performance can be expected to be optimally realized after a relative short lifespan of the fund (typically 3 years). This is to a larger extent the case for late stage funds and funds raising follow-on funds during hot equity markets.
The aforementioned results provide interesting insights to both signaling and private equity literature, amongst others. It may however be argued that, in our analysis, performance is just a mediator between PE firm human capital or reputation and the likelihood of raising followon funds. Indeed, Zarutskie (2010) shows that the human capital of a VC management team managing a first-time VC fund is an important driver of VC fund performance. She further shows that PE managers with more task-specific human capital in managing a start-up and more industry-specific human capital in consulting increase the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Our results might hence be attributed to unobserved difference in the quality of first-time PE funds. Nevertheless, we control for the size of first-time PE funds, which is likely to capture some inherent quality differences between first-time funds. More importantly, we show that first-time PE funds with higher performance do not simply have a higher likelihood of raising follow-on funds. Indeed, we do not find evidence that first time early stage funds with a higher realized performance have a higher likelihood of raising follow-on funds, nor do we find that evidence that first-time funds with higher realized performance have a higher likelihood of raising follow-on funds in cold equity markets. As such, it is not likely that our findings can be entirely attributed to such mediation effect.
Our findings have implications for academia and practitioners. For academia, our research has important implications to the signaling and private equity literatures. By linking signaling theory to the attention-based view, we provide an insight into which mechanisms explain the effectiveness of signals. Specifically, we show that it is less effective to send signals which are not found very credible or which are not in line with the signal receiver's expectations, which is the case for realized performance signaled by early stage funds or in cold equity markets. In such situations and contexts, the signal receiver's attention is largely focused on unrealized performance signals. Further, our research context allowed to study performance signals in a continuum, while previous research has, often limited by available measures, dichotomized these firms in high-quality and low-quality firms. In sum, our research contributes to the signaling literature by studying gaps related to the continuum of signals, while taking into account the signaling environment and taking the perspective of the receiver, while extant research has focused on the perspective of the signaler (Connelly et al., 2011) . We further make an important contribution to the private equity literature. While previous studies have highlighted the importance of performance for follow-on fund raising, we confirm these findings in the context of first-time funds, while our findings indicate that performance is not a homogeneous construct, and that unrealized and realized performance is attended to by signal receivers differently, and contingent on situational and contextual factors.
For practitioners, including general and limited partners of private equity funds, our findings provide interesting insights into which signals are more effective in which situations. Specifically, our research shows that realized performance signals are more effective in hot equity markets and Note. All correlations with absolute value greater than 0.12 are significant at p < 0.05. Fund location and fund industry focus controls are not reported. Variables 1, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are dummy variables, hence their correlations should be interpreted with care. Note. Robust standard errors clustered by vintage year are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 and † p < 0.10 (conservative two-tailed tests).
